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This paper defines scientific realism as the view that “we know that we already have the truth, 
or something very close” (Nickles 2017: 159), and scientific antirealism as the view that we 
do not “have sufficient evidence and argument to conclude with confidence that even our 
most mature theories are true, or very nearly, that at best minor tweaking will be necessary” 
(Nickles 2017: 151). Thomas Nickles (2017) rejects realism and accepts antirealism by 
appealing to various theoretical resources: the illusion hypothesis (Quoidbach, Gilbert, and 
Wilson 2013), the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, Darwin’s evolutionary theory, 
and the problem of underdetermination. 
This paper aims to show that Nickles’s case against realism fails. In Section 2, I expound 
the aforementioned theoretical resources one by one, and then argue that both the illusion 
hypothesis and evolutionary theory clash with the pessimistic induction and with the problem 
of underdetermination. In Section 3, I show that Nickles’s positive philosophical theories fall 
prey to Park’s (2017a) pessimistic induction over antirealists. I also argue that the Golden 
Rule applies to antirealists on epistemic matters, so if antirealists do not want scientists to run 
the pessimistic induction over antirealists, antirealists ought not to run the pessimistic 
induction over scientific theories. 
 
2. Nickles’s Theoretical Resources 
2.1. The Illusion Hypothesis and the Pessimistic Induction 
Jordi Quoidbach, Daniel Gilbert, Timothy Wilson (2013) discovered a cognitive illusion 
called the end of history illusion. As we age, our preferences, values, and personalities 
undergo radical changes. We, however, tend to believe that they will undergo little change 
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during the rest of our lives, despite believing that they have undergone radical changes in the 
past. Quoidbach, Gilbert, and Wilson (2013) asked one group of subjects how much they had 
changed over the past ten years, and another group how much they would change over the 
next ten years. There was a wide discrepancy between the reports of the two groups, which 
indicates that “people underestimate the extent to which their personalities, values, and 
preferences will change in the future” (Quoidbach, Gilbert, and Wilson 2013: 98). The phrase, 
‘the end of history illusion,’ originates from the observation that people regard the present as 
a watershed moment at which their eventfulness in their lives ends. Let me call the illusion 
hypothesis Quoidbach, Gilbert, and Wilson’s psychological hypothesis that people tend to 
think that their lives in the future will not be dynamic, even though they think that their lives 
in the past were dynamic.  
According to Nickles, the illusion hypothesis has an important implication for realism. 
Realism holds that our best current theories are (approximately) true, which implies that there 
will be few innovative changes in future science, although there have been many innovative 
changes in past science. The end of history illusion erroneously “leads us to believe that the 
future will be relatively flat, uneventful, in relevant respects (cf. Quoidbach et al. 2013)” 
(Nickles 2017: 152). Realists are those “who cannot fully resist the temptations of the 
cognitive-historical illusions” (Nickles 2017: 162). Since realism originates from the 
cognitive illusion, we should reject it and accept antirealism. 
Nickles grounds antirealism not only on the illusion hypothesis but also on the pessimistic 
induction over scientific theories. It holds that the downfall of present theories, such as the 
oxygen theory of combustion and the germ theory of diseases, can be extrapolated from that 
of past theories, such as the phlogiston theory of combustion and the miasma theory of 
diseases (Poincaré 1905/1952: 160; Mach 1911: 17; Hesse 1976: 266; Laudan 1977: 126; 
Putnam 1978: 25; Wray 2007; Wray 2010: 371; Wray 2013: 4327; Khalifa 2010). For the 
sake of argument, this paper agrees with Nickles that the pessimistic induction is correct.1 
The purpose of this paper is not to criticize it, but rather to expose its disastrous implications 
for antirealists. 
Nickles says, “just about every attempt to predict long-term futures has been a ludicrous 
failure, including scientific and technological futures and even when ‘long term’ is only 100 
years” (2017: 153). Just as we think that there will be few changes in our future, while 
thinking that there have been many changes in our past, so realists think that there will be few 
innovations in future science, while thinking that there have been many innovations in past 
science. In addition, just as we are wrong about our lives in the future, so realists are wrong 
about future science. All these mistaken views are due to the end of history of illusion. 
An influential criticism of the pessimistic induction is that present theories are more 
successful than past theories (Musgrave 1985: 211; Leplin 1997: 141; Doppelt 2007: 111; 
Doppelt 2011; Saatsi 2009: 358; Devitt 2011: 292; Fahrbach 2011a; Fahrbach 2011b: 1290; 
Park 2011: 80; Mizrahi 2013; Doppelt 2014). Present scientists use more rigorous methods 
and more advanced technologies than past scientists did, so the former can explain and 
predict more phenomena than the latter. The superiority of present theories over past theories 
nullifies the pessimistic inference from past to present theories. 
In response, Nickles presents a brilliant defense of the pessimistic induction, inviting us 
to imagine what past scientists thought of their theories, and what future scientists will think 
of ours: 
 
Why should we think that today’s best science is true when past scientists believed the same of 
their science – which we reject today as badly wrong? The answer some strong realists give is that 
                                                          
1 See Park (2018a) for a summary of problems with the pessimistic induction. 
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today’s science is now mature, whereas theirs was not. After all, we now know of flaws in their 
theories, their instrumentation, their experimental design, their goals and standards, etc. But wait! 
What is to keep our distant successors from saying the same about us? Just because today’s most 
successful theoretical claims seem practically flawless to us does not mean that they really are. 
(Nickles 2017: 153) 
 
Similar arguments are developed by K. Brad Wray (2013: 4327) and Mario Alai (2017: 3282). 
These philosophers admit that present theories are superior to past theories, but argue that 
present theories will be overthrown, just as past theories were, on the grounds that our 
descendants will look at our theories with distain, just as we look at our ancestors’ theories 
with disdain. This defense of the pessimistic induction is impressive and admirable. 
What are we to make of Nickles’s double-barreled attack on realism? The two barrels, 
viz., the illusion hypothesis and the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, are 
incompatible with each other. The pessimistic induction applies to the illusion hypothesis as 
well as to other scientific hypotheses. It is wrong to think that the pessimistic induction 
applies to physics, chemistry, and biology, but not to psychology. Many psychological 
hypotheses have been discarded in the history of psychology. For example, Noam Chomsky 
(1959) demolished B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism with the observation that children could 
construct new sentences. The pessimistic induction implies that since past psychological 
hypotheses have been rejected, present psychological hypotheses, including the illusion 
hypothesis, will also be rejected.  
Nickles might reply that present psychological hypotheses are superior to past 
psychological hypotheses. Present psychologists use more rigorous methods and more 
advanced instruments to confirm psychological hypotheses. Moreover, present psychologists 
know about the flaws with past psychological hypotheses. It follows that although 
behaviorism was discarded, the illusion hypothesis will not be. 
My rejoinder to this possible reply is to admit that present psychological hypotheses are 
superior to past ones, but to argue that future psychologists will look at present psychological 
hypotheses with disdain, just as present psychologists look at past psychological hypotheses 
with disdain, and hence that present psychological hypotheses will follow the unfortunate 
path of past psychological hypotheses. Thus, the illusion hypothesis is just as unwarranted as 
behaviorism was. 
This conclusion should be agreeable not only to Nickles but also to Wray and Alai, given 
that these philosophers stick to the pessimistic induction in spite of the superiority of present 
theories over past theories, on the grounds that future scientists will look at present theories 
with disdain, just as present scientists look at past theories with disdain. In a nutshell, their 
brilliant defense of the pessimistic induction backfires on the illusion hypothesis, and hence 
on Nickles’s case against realism. 
 
2.2. Evolutionary Theory and the Pessimistic Induction 
Another influential response to the pessimistic induction is selectivism, according to which 
present theories preserved some theoretical assumptions of past theories, so future theories 
will preserve some theoretical assumptions of present theories. Those assumptions are worthy 
of our beliefs whereas other assumptions are not. Selectivism is endorsed by many 
prestigious philosophers, such as John Worrall (1989), Philip Kitcher (1993: Chapters 4 and 
5), Stathis Psillos (1999: Chapter 6, 2009), Anjan Chakravartty (2008), Patrick Enfield (2008), 
David Harker (2008), Juha Saatsi (2009), and Peter Vickers (2017). 
Nickles presents a novel argument against selectivism making use of evolutionary theory, 





Note that the realist response to Kuhnian revolution claims – that there was, in fact, a good deal of 
continuity between the predecessor and successor theory or paradigm – does nothing to address the 
long-term evolutionary point. You can have all the continuity you want between temporally 
adjacent work, but over a long enough time the changes can be radical. (Nickles 2017: 159) 
 
To take an example, some theoretical assumptions were carried over from the caloric theory 
of heat to the kinetic theory of heat. But the kinetic theory will be supplanted by an 
alternative hitherto unconceived, and the alternative will be surpassed by its successor, etc. 
After enough scientific revolutions, the successive theories of heat will share no theoretical 
assumptions. Thus, selectivism falls prey to the “basic lessen from evolutionary biology that 
very slow evolution can be as transformative as you please, given enough time” (Nickles 
2017: 158). As far as I can tell, Nickles has ingeniously combined the pessimistic induction 
with evolutionary theory to discredit selectivism. 
On close examination, however, it is incoherent to combine the pessimistic induction with 
evolutionary theory. Evolutionary theory is one of the present theories at which the 
pessimistic induction is directed. So if the pessimistic induction is correct, evolutionary 
theory is unwarranted. If, however, evolutionary theory is warranted, the pessimistic 
induction is incorrect. Nickles cannot have both the pessimistic induction and evolutionary 
theory. It is just as wrong to think that biology is exempted from the pessimistic induction, as 
it is to think that psychology is exempted from the pessimistic induction. 
Nickles’s appeal to evolutionary theory resembles those of Thomas Kuhn and Wray. 
Appealing to evolutionary theory, Kuhn (1962/1970: 172) argues that scientific development 
is not a truth-oriented process, just as biological evolution is not a goal-oriented process. In a 
similar vein, Wray (2011: 136) argues that science loses old concepts when a scientific 
revolution occurs, just as organisms lose their morphologies when speciation occurs. Park 
(2017b: 325–328) objects that it is self-refuting for Kuhn and Wray to appeal to evolutionary 
theory to justify their revolutionary philosophical views about science. Kuhn’s (1962/1970) 
revolutionary philosophy of science implies that evolutionary theory flounders in an ocean of 
anomalies and will be displaced by an alternative theory. Moreover, evolutionary theory and 
the alternative will be incommensurable, so that present and future biologists will live in 
different worlds (Park 2018b: 65). A similar point applies to Wray. Wray’s (2011: 136) 
revolutionary philosophy of science implies that the concepts in evolutionary theory will be 
dropped, once it is displaced by its successor. Moreover, Wray (2007, 2010: 371, 2013: 4327) 
vigorously defends the pessimistic induction, which dictates that he should not assent to 
evolutionary theory. Nickles, Kuhn, and Wray have made the same mistake of appealing to 
evolutionary theory to support the pessimistic philosophical view about scientific theories, 
unwittingly and incorrectly presupposing that evolutionary theory is an exception to their 
pessimistic view about scientific theories. 
 
2.3. Underdetermination, the Illusion Hypothesis, and Evolutionary Theory 
Nickles rejects Hilary Putnam’s (1975: 73) no-miracles argument for realism. To put briefly, 
the no-miracles argument holds that the truth of successful theories best explains their 
success, so successful theories are true. Nickles objects that antirealists “do not regard 
apparent explanatory success as sufficient reason to conclude truth, owing to 
underdetermination, etc., yet the inference to truth as the best explanation for the success of 
science makes a similar move at the metalevel” (2017: 159). In other words, antirealists do 
not believe that explanatory success is a reliable indicator of truth due to underdetermination, 
5 
 
but the no-miracles argument relies on explanatory success, so it begs the question against 
antirealists. 
Nickles’s appeal to underdetermination, however, is problematic. Underdetermination 
nullifies his previous appeal to the illusion hypothesis and evolutionary theory. The illusion 
hypothesis is advanced to explain the reports of the two groups of subjects in the 
psychological experiment mentioned above. Evolutionary theory is advanced to explain 
various biological phenomena (Darwin 1859/1993: passim). Both the illusion hypothesis and 
evolutionary theory, however, are underdetermined, so even if they best explain phenomena, 
they are unwarranted. You can achieve nothing by appealing to the unwarranted hypothesis 
and the unwarranted theory. 
 
3. The Golden Rule 
Park (2017a) advances the pessimistic induction over antirealists. Let me summarize it and 
elucidate its negative consequence for antirealists, including Nickles. The purpose of 
conjuring up the pessimistic induction over antirealists is to yield an opportunity for 
antirealists to imagine how scientists would respond to antirealists’ pessimistic induction over 
scientific theories. 
Park (2017a) observes that antirealists have made many philosophical mistakes. For 
example, Stanford (2000) suggests that a false theory is successful because it is predictively 
similar to a true theory. This suggestion is similar to the one that a coin is round because it is 
similar to another coin in terms of shape. Both suggestions put the cart before the horse. We 
should rather say that a coin is similar to another coin because they are spherical. Similarly, 
we should rather say that a false theory is predictively similar to a true theory because they 
are successful (Park 2017c: 619). To take another example, van Fraassen (1989: 143) runs the 
argument from a bad lot against inference to the best explanation, without realizing that it 
applies not only to scientific theories but also to van Fraassen’s (1980: Chapter 5) contextual 
theory of explanation. Park concludes that antirealists “have made philosophical mistakes in 
the past, so they must be making philosophical mistakes now” (2017a: 31).2 
Nickles is an antirealist, so he is susceptible to Park’s pessimistic induction over 
antirealists. Nickles’s positive philosophical theories, whatever they might be, will be thrown 
out simply because antirealists have made philosophical mistakes in the past. For example, 
Nickles defends what might be called the craft theory of scientific progress, according to 
which scientific progress “is a matter of trial and error, constrained by what is already known, 
and by current desiderata, a form of artificial selection” (2016: 379). We ought to reject it 
because it is proposed by an antirealist. 
Nickles might object that it is unfair to predict that his positive philosophical theories will 
be abandoned without even specifying his arguments for them. Predicting the future of his 
positive philosophical theories requires that we should thoroughly evaluate his arguments for 
them. If the arguments are strong, we should predict that his theories will not be overturned; 
if they are weak, we should predict that they will be overturned. Our prediction about the fate 
of his theories should be predicated not on whether his predecessors have made mistakes or 
not, but on whether the arguments for them are strong or weak.3 
In reply, I point out that the pessimistic induction over antirealists merely mirrors the 
pessimistic induction over scientific theories. When pessimists run the pessimistic induction 
over scientific theories, they do not even specify scientists’ arguments for present theories, to 
                                                          
2 Similar arguments against antirealists were constructed by Park (2014), Moti Mizrahi (2016), and 
Park (2017c). 
3 Park (2017d: 99) develops this line of thinking to defend present scientific theories from the 
pessimistic induction over scientific theories. 
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say nothing of thoroughly evaluating them. Their predictions about the fate of present 
theories rest exclusively on the historical fact that past theories were refuted. Nickles is not an 
exception on this account. I am merely playing a pessimist, treating Nickles’s philosophical 
theories in the way that pessimists treat scientific theories. If my treatment of his 
philosophical theories is unfair, pessimists’ treatment of scientific theories is equally unfair, 
in which case the pessimist program collapses altogether. 
Antirealists might argue that their philosophical theories are better than their 
predecessors,’ so it is illegitimate to predict the downfall of their theories from that of their 
predecessors.’ This move, however, is vulnerable to the objection that our descendants will 
look at their philosophical theories with disdain, just as we look at their predecessors’ 
philosophical theories with disdain. Thus, antirealists’ philosophical theories fall prey to the 
aforementioned brilliant defense of the pessimistic induction over scientific theories 
advanced by Nickles (2017: 153), Wray (2013: 4327), and Alai (2017: 3282). 
Antirealists might now admit that their philosophical theories will be overthrown, but 
insist that they will not be overthrown in toto. There is a grain of truth in their positive 
theories that will be carried over to their successors. This move, however, is susceptible to the 
objection that if enough time passes, antirealists’ successive theories will not share any 
assumption. It follows that no component of their philosophical theories is worthy of our 
belief. 
Moreover, if antirealists resist the pessimistic induction over antirealists, realists can 
accuse them of being caught in the end of history illusion. After all, the antirealist belief that 
their present philosophical theories will not undergo radical change originates from the 
illusion hypothesis that the future will be monotonous, although the past was eventful. It is 
wrong for antirealists to think that realists’ resistance to the pessimistic induction over 
scientific theories stems from the end of history illusion, but that antirealists’ resistance to the 
pessimistic induction over antirealists stems from good epistemic reasons. 
In this section, I ran the pessimistic induction over antirealists in response to antirealists’ 
pessimistic induction over scientific theories. An anonymous referee objects that my response 
is built upon the distinction between science and philosophy of science, so I have the burden 
to explicate the distinction. 
In this context, I define science as an attempt to understand the world, and philosophy of 
science as an attempt to understand science. This distinction, however, would be rejected by 
many philosophers, such as Bas van Fraassen (1989: 131), Larry Laudan (1981: 19), Greg 
Frost-Arnold (2010), and Mizrahi (2012). These philosophers embrace naturalism according 
to which there is no strict distinction between science and philosophy, and there is no 
methodological difference between them either. In the naturalist vein, Nickles accuses 
realism of making an unscientific prediction that present scientific theories will not be 
overthrown. He says, “such a claim is not really a scientific prediction, I would claim, but a 
forecast or even a prophesy” (2017: 157). Naturalists, such as Nickles, have no choice but to 
accept my view that if scientists and scientific theories are susceptible to pessimistic 
inductions, philosophers and philosophical theories are also susceptible to pessimistic 
inductions. 
The pessimistic induction over antirealists has the implication that the moment antirealists 
entertain philosophical theories, they are fated to be discarded. Antirealists might complain 
that the pessimistic induction dampens their aspiration to develop new philosophical theories, 
i.e., it diminishes their motivation to come up with new philosophical theories. After all, if 
antirealists’ philosophical theories have such a dismal fate, it is pointless for antirealists to 
conceive of them and gather evidence for them. Since the pessimistic induction has such a 
7 
 
negative impact on antirealists’ philosophical enterprise, it is a deplorable idea and should be 
dismissed. 
This complaint, however, is not available to Nickles. Consider how Nickles (2017: 161–
162) responds to Karl Popper’s (1963: Chapter 3) similar objection to instrumentalism. 
Popper accuses instrumentalism of dampening scientists’ curiosity and diminishing their 
motivation to conduct research into unobservables. Popper’s critique of instrumentalism can 
be applied to the pessimistic induction over scientific theories. That is, the pessimistic 
induction diminishes scientists’ motivation to conduct research into unobservables and to 
come up with new scientific theories. Nickles, however, denies that the pessimistic induction 
diminishes scientists’ motivation to develop and defend new theories, saying that “the 
position I defend encourages talented investigators to be bolder, to treat the future as still 
open to significant changes” (2017: 161). 
Just as Nickles denies that the pessimistic induction over scientific theories decreases 
scientists’ motivation to conduct research into unobservables, so I deny that the pessimistic 
induction over antirealists decreases antirealists’ motivation to theorize about science. Just as 
Nickles encourages scientists to be bolder and come up with new scientific theories despite 
believing that they will only succumb to the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, so 
I encourage antirealists to be bolder and come up with new philosophical theories despite 
believing that they will only succumb to the pessimistic induction over antirealists. If it is 
rational for Nickles to encourage scientists to do the futile things, it is also rational for me to 
encourage antirealists do to the futile things. His position and my position rise or fall together. 
In the face of this objection, antirealists might contend that we should treat the two 
pessimistic inductions differently. Specifically, the pessimistic induction over antirealists 
decreases antirealists’ motivation to theorize about science, but the pessimistic induction over 
scientific theories does not decrease scientists’ motivation to conduct research into 
unobservables. Since the pessimistic induction over antirealists has a negative impact on 
antirealists, it should be discarded. By contrast, since the pessimistic induction over scientific 
theories does not have a negative impact on scientists, it should be retained. 
This move, however, would run into some disconcerting questions: Why is it that the 
pessimistic induction over antirealists dampens their aspiration for truths about science but 
the pessimistic induction over scientific theories does not dampen scientists’ aspiration for 
truths about unobservables? Do scientists have stronger minds than antirealist philosophers? 
Do scientists have more fortitude and endurance than antirealist philosophers, enabling them 
to maintain their research into unobservables despite antirealist philosophers’ negative 
expectations? Antirealist philosophers owe us convincing answers to these questions. 
Without such answers, scientists could take the opposite position: the pessimistic induction 
over scientific theories dampens scientists’ aspiration for truths about unobservables, but the 
pessimistic induction over antirealists does not dampen their aspiration for truths about 
science. Consequently, we should retain the pessimistic induction over antirealists, but 
discard the pessimistic induction over scientific theories. 
Let me draw a philosophical moral from my discussion of Nickles’s case for antirealism 
so far. When antirealists defend the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, they might 
as well imagine how scientists would respond to it. Scientists might run the pessimistic 
induction over antirealists, reminding antirealists of the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you. There is no reason for thinking that the Golden Rule ranges 
over moral matters, but not over epistemic matters. So if antirealists do not want scientists to 
run the pessimistic induction over antirealists, antirealists ought not to run the pessimistic 





Nickles appeals to the illusion hypothesis, the pessimistic induction over scientific theories, 
evolutionary theory, and the problem of underdetermination to refute realism and to defend 
antirealism. Specifically, he contends that realism arose from the end of history illusion, that 
the demise of present theories can be inferred from that of past theories, successive theories 
do not share theoretical assumptions if enough times passes, and that underdetermination bars 
explanatory success from establishing truth. 
I objected that the illusion hypothesis and evolutionary theory are not insulated from the 
pessimistic induction over scientific theories and from the problem of underdetermination. 
The pessimistic induction implies that the illusion hypothesis and evolutionary theory will be 
discarded, just as their predecessors were discarded. The problem of underdetermination 
implies that the illusion hypothesis and evolutionary theory are unwarranted because they are 
underdetermined, so their explanatory success does not show that they are true. In short, it is 
incoherent for Nickles to appeal to the conflicting theoretical resources. 
Finally, I argued that the pessimistic induction over antirealists spells doom for Nickles’s 
positive philosophical theories. The purpose of running the pessimistic induction over 
antirealists against his positive philosophical theories was to draw a philosophical moral: The 
Golden Rule applies to epistemic matters as well as to moral matters, so antirealists ought to 
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